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Abstract
The recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Hutchinson 
v United Kingdom (2015) is the latest twist in the political legal struggle between 
Westminster and Strasbourg. Whilst the British government has made several succes­
sions to the ECtHR regarding the role of the executive in the imprisonment of lifers, 
the thorny issue of the whole of life tariff, and prospect of prisoner release under that 
tariff, has been an ongoing debate. Whilst the ECtHR appeared to directly challenge 
domestic policy in the preceding decision in Vinter and Others v United Kingdom this 
latest decision, the seeming retreat from Vinter, by the Fourth Section of the court, 
appears to be more of a response to hard line domestic politics than a continuation of 
holistic legal principle which the ECtHR has outwardly supported in the past.
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1 Introduction
…the extraordinary attachment of the English to their system of law 
(if indeed it can be called a system), the positive affection it inspires, the 
awe inspiring confidence, often unwarranted, which they repose in its 
ability to do justice, the tenacity, indeed ferocity with which they refuse 
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to modify it with foreign importations is one of the most important 
national characteristics.
johnson, 2010, cited in Grieve, 2014
Contrary to popular belief, life imprisonment was not intended to have a literal 
meaning in the uk following the abolition of the death penalty (Shute, 2004). 
Although calls for ‘life to mean life’, particularly for those convicted of murder, 
have been persistent in recent years (see, for example, Clark, 2003; Dawar, 2011; 
Telegraph View, 2014), legislators have remained somewhat impervious to pub­
lic opinion, even through a period of punitive populism. Although average sen­
tence lengths have increased (Prison Reform Trust, 2014), declaring a person, at 
the imposition of sentence, to be unfit to ever be released back into society has 
been a rare occurrence. Although rare, politicians have been eager, since the 
inception of the whole of life tariff, to stress that life will mean life, for a select 
few. Rarity of imposition though has not precluded challenges to the sentence, 
most substantially in Vinter and Others v United Kingdom (2015). The decision 
of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 
Vinter went further than the Strasbourg court had ever gone before in its regu­
lation of whole of life sentences: penological principles justifying continued 
imprisonment must be reviewed; and a process of review needs to be in place 
at the time sentence is imposed, so a prisoner will know what he or she has to 
do to be considered for release. The British political response to the Vinter 
decision was swift, robust, and confrontational. Rather than affirming its posi­
tion though, based on holistic legal principle, the European Court has amelio­
rated that public confrontation with the most recent decision in Hutchinson v 
United Kingdom, a departure from the Vinter decision, seemingly in response 
to political pressure.
This paper explores the politics of whole of life sentences which, not only 
dominate their maintenance domestically but, have seemingly pushed the 
ECtHR into a retreat. This paper explores the assertion that politics have tri­
umphed over legal principles and that the hardened position of the uk gov­
ernment, and the threat to withdraw from the European Convention and the 
Strasbourg court, is the reason for the ECtHR reversal of position in Hutchinson 
v United Kingdom.
At the end of December 2014 there were fifty five people serving a whole of 
life sentence in England and Wales, seven of those were held in secure hospi­
tals, the remainder in the main prison estate: fifty three men, two women 
(Ministry of Justice, 2015).
Since the enactment of the Criminal Justice Act (2003) a whole of life 
order, now only imposed by a judge, is considered only when the seriousness 
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of the offence is exceptionally high involving, according to Section  21 of 
the Act:
(a)  the murder of two or more persons, where each murder involves 
any of the following­
(i) A substantial degree of premeditation or planning,
(ii) the abduction of the victim, or
(iii) sexual or sadistic conduct,
(b)  the murder of a child if involving the abduction of the child or sex­
ual or sadistic motivation,
(c)  a murder done for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, 
racial or ideological cause, or
(d)  a murder by an offender previously convicted of murder” (Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 Section 21)
Section 2 of this paper outlines the historical developments and context which 
have cultivated the current relationship between the executive and judiciary in 
the sentencing of lifers, and how that relationship has been adjudicated by the 
ECtHR. Section 3 then charts the different approaches to life sentencing in 
Westminster and Strasbourg. Section 4 notes the hardened position of 
Westminster in response to the decision of Vinter and Others and the ECtHR 
generally. Section 5 asserts the success of political pressure, and the conse­
quent retreat from the position set out in Vinter, in the latest case at the ECtHR 
regarding whole of life sentences, Hutchinson v United Kingdom, before the 
conclusion notes that the issue of whole of life tariffs, and the subsequent ten­
sion between Westminster and Strasbourg, will not likely end here.
2 History of Life in the uk
Over time, the release of murderers has provoked significant public backlash 
(Kandelia, 2011:70) with inevitable calls for truth in sentencing, mimicking the 
populist policies found across the Atlantic (Lubitz and Ross, 2001). Domestic 
policy has largely avoided such calls, weathering sporadic instances of serious 
crimes, including murder, being committed by known violent offenders 
released from prison (Steele, 2007; Whitehead, 2010; Robinson, 2013). Life impris­
onment in the uk does not, for the overwhelming majority, mean life, nor 
was it ever planned to, despite misconceptions of what was intended at the 
time the death penalty was abolished (Blom­Cooper, 1996:708, 1999:900; 
Kandelia, 2011:72). Somewhat prophetically though, when abolition of the 
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death penalty was debated, the Home Secretary acknowledged that, in some 
circumstances, whole of life imprisonment may be required to protect society 
from an extremely dangerous offender (Kandelia, 2011:72).
Until the 1957 Homicide Act all those convicted of murder were sentenced 
to death. The 1957 Act then drew a distinction between capital and non­capital 
murders yet, proving an unsatisfactory distinction, the pace to abolish capital 
punishment quickened. Eventually the death penalty was abolished in the 
United Kingdom, in 1965, under the Murder (Abolition of the Death Penalty) 
Act. Following abolition, it was for the Home Secretary to determine the release 
of those convicted of murder. The Murder (Abolition of the Death Penalty) Act 
though imposed two changes upon the release procedures for murderers. 
Firstly, the trial judge could state in open court how long a murderer should 
serve in prison before he was to be considered for release. Secondly, the Home 
Secretary was required to consult the judiciary before releasing a murderer on 
licence (although the Home Secretary was free to depart from any judicial rec­
ommendation) (Shute, 2004:876; Kandelia, 2011:74). The executive occupying a 
judicial role was accepted as the norm, a practice that gave no cause for con­
cern. The Home Secretary’s power was absolute and unchallenged. That power 
would be drastically curtailed though, if not fully abandoned, following the 
establishment of the Parole Board in 1967.
Upon the creation of the Parole Board, the Home Secretary was then only 
able to order the release of a life sentenced prisoner after a positive recom­
mendation from the board, and after consultation with the Lord Chief Justice 
(and trial judge if still available). Retaining some control, however, the Home 
Secretary decided, in the first place, which cases were referred to the Parole 
Board (Kandelia, 2011:74). Affirmative decisions for release were common and, 
coinciding with public fears over rising crime rates at the time, there came the 
inevitable backlash against early release for lifers (Shute, 2004:881). So, in 1983, 
the Home Secretary announced his intent to use his discretion to ensure a 
minimum of twenty years for those who had murdered a police or prison offi­
cer, those who had killed during the course of a robbery, child killers, terrorists, 
and those who committed murder of a sexual or sadistic nature (Shute, 
2004:881; Kandelia, 2011:74).
New guidelines were announced, for both discretionary and mandatory life 
sentences which introduced two phases: the punishment phase and the risk 
phase. The punishment phase, that is the tariff, would be served to satisfy the 
principles of deterrence and retribution. After completion of the tariff, prison­
ers would be risk assessed to determine if it was safe for them to be released. 
For all prisoners sentenced to twenty years or more, there would be a review, 
by the Home Secretary, after they had served seventeen years (Shute, 2004:883). 
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Whilst the judiciary could advise on the length of time required to satisfy ele­
ments of retribution and deterrence the discretion to release would ultimately 
remain with the Home Secretary (Kandelia, 2011:75). This scenario, effective 
for all lifers, was somewhat short lived though after the intervention of the 
ECtHR.
In Thynne Wilson and Gunnell v United Kingdom (1991) the ECtHR held, in 
respect of discretionary life sentenced prisoners, that Article 5(4) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights which requires lawful detention to be 
imposed by a court, had been breached. In a concession to the court, as part of 
the Criminal Justice Act (1991), discretionary life sentenced prisoners would 
then have their tariff set by the trial judge, in open court, and their release 
would be considered by the Discretionary Lifer Panel, part of the Parole Board, 
a decision which the Home Secretary could not then veto (Kandelia, 2011:76). 
The situation for mandatory lifers, however, remained unchanged, the Home 
Secretary, in fact, frequently set a higher tariff, in excess of that recommended 
by the trial judge (Shute, 2004:885).
In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Doody (1993) the 
House of Lords affirmed the sentencing role of the Home Secretary with 
respect to mandatory lifers. However, the Law Lords did agree that the prisoner 
should be informed of the judicial recommendation and be allowed to make 
written representations before the tariff was decided (Kandelia, 2011: 76). After 
Doody, the seventeen year review was unnecessary; all mandatory lifers would 
know their tariffs and could now expect a review three years before their tariff 
expired. For those few subject to a sentence of natural life a ministerial review 
was promised after twenty five years, to determine the suitability of converting 
the sentence to a determinate period. Further reviews would then take place 
every five years (Kandelia, 2011:77). One month following the Doody judge­
ment, however, the Home Secretary reaffirmed his right in exceptional cases to 
raise or lower a tariff, stressing that his discretion to release a mandatory lifer 
would only occur upon his satisfaction that so doing would not threaten the 
maintenance of public confidence in the criminal justice system (Shute, 
2004:886).
Whilst the ECtHR accepted the uk government’s claim that murder was an 
exceptional crime, and that it was lawful for the Home Secretary to decide 
upon the imprisonment of mandatory life sentenced prisoners in Wynne v 
United Kingdom (1994), decided a year after Doody, that position would last 
less than a decade. In Stafford v United Kingdom (2002) the ECtHR held that the 
power of the Home Secretary to veto release decisions made by the Parole Board 
was in contravention of Article 5(1) and 5(4) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. As a result, later in the same year the House of Lords, in R (on the 
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application of Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2002), held 
that the Home Secretary’s power of setting the tariff for mandatory lifers amounted 
to a sentencing exercise and was therefore contrary to Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. In response to Anderson, Section  269 of the 
Cri minal Justice Act 2003 transferred the power of setting tariffs to the trial 
judge (although the government produced guidelines for judges to follow in 
deciding the appropriate starting point for a tariff), and, as a consequence of 
that power transfer, whole of life tariffs found their way into legislation.
3 Life in Strasbourg and Life in Westminster
The issue of whole of life tariffs reached the ECtHR in the case of Kafkaris v 
Cyprus in 2003. Domestically, the issue had been regarded as resolved after R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Hindley (2000) in which the 
House of Lords had rejected Myra Hindley’s1 challenge of the legality of her 
sentence. In so doing, the Law Lords relied upon the policy statement of then 
Home Secretary, Jack Straw, that he would review whole of life tariffs from time 
to time and at the point of twenty five years (Kandelia, 2011:78). Whole of life 
sentences then were regarded as both legal and justifiable by the judiciary and, 
repeatedly, by politicians (Daily Mail News, 2002). Indeed, the debate on the 
fate of Hindley produced several pledges from government ministers that 
some prisoners, on the basis of their offences alone, would never again see 
freedom (bbc News, 1998). Myra Hindley died in 2002, whilst still in custody, 
and so never had the opportunity to have her case heard by the ECtHR. In 
Kafkaris though, in a similar scenario to Hindley, a prisoner, found guilty of 
premeditated murder, who had had their whole of life tariff imposed by the 
government, appealed to the Strasbourg court. Whilst the court upheld the 
imposition of a mandatory sentence it did state there may be an issue with 
respect to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights if the 
sentence was irreducible. The Cypriot government contended that whole 
of life was not irreducible as the President, on the recommendation of, or in 
1 Myra Hindley, Britain’s longest serving female prisoner, was convicted of the murder of two 
children, and as an accessory to one other, in 1966. In 1974 she was sentenced to an additional 
year’s imprisonment for her role in a prison escape plot. Although in 1987 Hindley admitted 
committing a further two murders, she was not charged or convicted of either. In 1990, then 
Home Secretary, David Waddington ruled that in Hindley’s case life must mean life. The tariff 
was supported and affirmed by successive Home Secretaries: Jack Straw, Michael Howard 
and David Blunkett (The Guardian, 2002; Stanford, 2002).
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 agreement with, the Attorney General could order the release of a whole life 
sentenced prisoner. Although the ECtHR noted that the release mechanism 
was limited, it did, at the time, satisfy the requirements of Article 3.
The issue would later be addressed domestically by the Court of Appeal in 
R v Bieber (2008). The first part of the appeal was in fact upheld, that the cir­
cumstances of the particular case did not warrant the imposition of a whole of 
life term.2 The second part of the appellant’s claim, however, was rejected, that 
whole of life orders were in contravention of Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The Court of Appeal drew on both domestic 
jurisprudence and that of the ECtHR to reach its decision that whole of life 
sentences were permissible under the Convention. Although narrower than 
the release procedures in Cyprus, reviewed in Kafkaris, the Home Secretary’s 
power of release under Section 30 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 was found 
to be enough to render the whole of life tariff not fully irreducible and, there­
fore, not in violation of Article 3.
Specifically, the criteria that must be met by a prisoner to be considered for 
release is set down in chapter 12 of the Indeterminate Sentence Manual (“the 
lifer manual”) issued by the Secretary of State as Prison Service Order 4700,
The criteria for compassionate release on medical grounds for all indeter­
minate sentence prisoners (isp) are as follows;
	 •	 	the	prisoner	 is	 suffering	 from	a	 terminal	 illness	and	death	 is	 likely	 
to occur very shortly (although there are no set time limits, 3 months 
may be considered to be an appropriate period for an application 
to be made to Public Protection Casework Section (ppcs)), or the 
isp (Indeterminate Sentenced Prisoner) is bedridden or similarly 
incapa cita ted, for example, those paralysed or suffering from a severe 
stroke; and
	 •	 	the	risk	of	re-offending	(particularly	of	a	sexual	or	violent	nature)	is	
minimal; and
	 •	 	further	imprisonment	would	reduce	the	prisoner’s	life	expectancy;	and
	 •	 	there	are	adequate	arrangements	for	the	prisoner’s	care	and	treatment	
outside prison; and
	 •	 	early	release	will	bring	some	significant	benefit	to	the	prisoner	or	his/
her family
Prison Service Order 4700
2 The applicant in Bieber had been convicted on one count of murder, two counts of attempted 
murder, and two counts of possession of a firearm and ammunition with intent to endanger 
life. His whole of life tariff was substituted with a term of 37 years (Kandelia, 2011:83).
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In Bieber, the domestic situation was confirmed and, until the case of Vinter 
and Others v United Kingdom, the ECtHR seemingly appeased. Vinter though 
challenged the restricted policy of review and asserted, moreover, that an 
adequate and clear policy of review (and possible release) needed to be in 
place at the time sentence was passed. In reviewing the appropriate time 
period for review the Strasbourg court, consulting various eu and interna­
tional law materials, recommended a twenty five year standard,
In cases where the sentence, on imposition, is irreducible under domes­
tic law, it would be capricious to expect the prisoner to work towards his 
own rehabilitation without knowing whether, at an unspecified, future 
date, a mechanism might be introduced which would allow him, on the 
basis of that rehabilitation, to be considered for release.
Vinter and Others v the United Kingdom
This standard had already been promised by former Home Secretaries in 1994 
and then again in 1997, a review of a whole life order, one that even encompassed 
exceptional progress made in prison (although this was not formalised in the 
2003 Criminal Justice Act). However, Vinter required more; it required an adjudi­
cation of penological principles for continued imprisonment. This was further 
than the court had gone before, prior to Vinter the court had “strongly insisted” 
that a life prisoner did not have a right under the Convention to have their sen­
tence reconsidered by a national authority with a view to its alteration or termi­
nation (Szydlo, 2013:502). All that had previously been required was that a whole 
life sentence not be irreducible (Kafkaris v Cyprus, 2003). The Vinter demand, 
however, if adhered to would create a significant inconsistency in domestic sen­
tencing procedures. Whilst the whole of life tariff is reserved for exceptional 
cases, murder with the presence of significant aggravating factors, as detailed 
under Section 21 of the 2003 Act, since the passage of the Act, between 2004 and 
2013, 596 tariffs of 25 years or more have been handed out in cases that failed to 
meet that seriousness threshold (foi Request 94091). With the implementation 
of Vinter, those cases would not require review, but whole of life tariffs (just 34 
handed out in the same period (foi Request 94091)) would. Reasonably then, if 
the direction of Vinter were followed, in essence a gross disproportionality test, 
more serious offenders, having committed more serious offences could be liable 
for release earlier than those who had committed less serious crimes; surely 
undermining the very philosophy and reasoning of the Strasbourg court.
The response to Vinter both legally and politically was swift and robust. 
Britain’s Lord Judge was highly critical of the Strasbourg court which, in his 
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view, was undemocratically claiming too much power (Kern, 2014). A view 
echoed by Lord Justice Laws, the longest serving appeals court judge in the 
country (Kern, 2014). The official judicial response, however, came with the 
decision rendered in R v Mcloughlin,
It is entirely consistent with the rule of law that such requests (for release) 
are considered on an individual basis against the criteria that circum­
stances have exceptionally changed so as to render the original punish­
ment which was justifiable no longer justifiable. We find it difficult to 
specify in advance what such circumstances might be, given that the 
heinous nature of the original crime justly required punishment by 
imprisonment for life. But circumstances can and do change in excep­
tional cases. The interpretation of s.30 we have set out provides for that 
possibility and hence gives to each such prisoner the possibility of excep­
tional release.
Lord Thomas, R v McLoughlin, 2014, Section 36:13
The Court of Appeal noted that the release criteria were highly restric­
tive,  but asserted that the Vinter court was mistaken in concluding that 
the statutory regime for the reducibility of the sentence was uncertain 
(R McLoughlin, 2014, Section 12). The Vinter court found a lack of clarity in 
applicable domestic law governing possible release from a whole of life 
tariff; the McLoughlin court disagreed and simply reaffirmed its posi­
tion  and view that the law, before Vinter, and unchanged after Vinter, 
provided hope and possibility of release in exceptional circumstances, 
circumstances which render the whole of life sentence no longer justifi­
able (R v McLoughlin, 2014, Section 35).
4 The Response to Vinter
What must be noted though, even before the Vinter decision and the instruc­
tion to conduct a meaningful review of whole life sentences, there had been a 
political standoff between Strasbourg and Westminster, after the uk had quite 
openly attacked the ECtHR and what it perceived to be unfavourable deci­
sions. Indeed, the most senior human right’s official in Europe, in response, 
had gone as far as defiantly telling the uk that it should in fact leave the 
Convention and remit of the court (acknowledging the ramification of a policy 
of selectively adhering to ECtHR judgements),
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If the uk, a founding member of the Council of Europe and one which 
has lost relatively few cases at the Court, decides to ‘cherry pick’ and 
selectively implement judgements, other states will invariably follow suit 
and the system will unravel very quickly.
Niels Muitznieks cited in Cohen, 2013
The Vinter case needs thus to be contextualised as the latest decision of the 
Strasbourg court that resounded negatively in Westminster; anti ECtHR feeling 
was already running high after unfavourable decisions regarding the extradi­
tion of foreign offenders and prisoner voting rights. After Vinter, the standoff 
in practice, and in principle, was public and clear. This was more confronta­
tional than in recent years where officials in Strasbourg had publicly stated 
they did not wish to antagonise the uk on the issue of human rights (Bowcott, 
2012). Still, the Conservative Party persistently noted the option (an intention 
if winners of the 2015 general election) to abolish the Human Rights Act (1998) 
which dictates compliance with Article 3 of the European Convention, and its 
reconsideration of remaining bound by the convention itself. Indeed, the 
Home Secretary had, quite publicly before the Vinter decision, announced the 
need for ‘a plan to deal with the ECtHR’ (bbc News, 2013), and a dissatisfaction 
that the British Supreme Court was not ‘supreme’ (EurActiv News, 2013). Calls 
by the Home Secretary were then only affirmed by the Prime Minister, David 
Cameron, a litany of issues; extradition of offenders, prisoner voting rights, and 
whole of life sentences, being used to consecrate the rhetoric of withdrawal 
from the Convention and court,
As a Prime Minister, what I want to know is can I keep our country safe. 
For instance, are we able to chuck out of our country people who have no 
right to be here, who threaten our country. I say we should be able to do 
that. Whatever that takes, we must deliver that outcome. And this is what 
I think we have the next 20 months to do, and put in our manifesto.
Prime Minister david cameron, cited in Kirkup, 2013
Through the political rhetoric the assertion of domestic sovereignty is clear, 
“there’s a real debate about who governs Britain and that the remit of the court 
has gone too far with the unlimited jurisprudence that it has and that that is no 
longer acceptable” (Justice Secretary Chris Grayling, cited in Bowcott, 2013). 
Days before the Vinter decision the Justice Secretary was, pre­emptively, assert­
ing the lack of legitimacy of the Strasbourg court, “I think that what we’ve got 
to a situation where the European Court of Human Rights has lost its legiti­
macy in the uk by doing things that frankly, the people of this country and 
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their elected representatives do not want” (Justice Secretary Chris Grayling, 
cited in Mason, 2013).
In the wake of the decision of the Grand Chamber in Vinter, numerous poli­
ticians were quick to voice their dismay and anger (Barrett, 2013); the Prime 
Minister was quoted as being “very, very, very, very disappointed … profoundly 
disagree(ing) with the court’s ruling … a strong supporter of whole life tariffs” 
(Watt and Travis, 2013).The Vinter rebuttal from Westminster was unwavering 
in its defiance to yet another perceived intrusion into domestic policy. The 
political rhetoric after Vinter has underscored that of recent years, certain pris­
oners, no matter what, will never again see beyond a prison cell (Kern, 2014) 
(meaning that the appellants in Vinter were no doubt correct then, that the 
possibility for release, for some prisoners at least, does not exist in any substan­
tive way). Chris Grayling, Justice Secretary, in the most explicit rejection of 
Vinter sentiment, sent a formal note to the Council of Europe, stating that 
whole of life sentenced prisoners in the uk would not receive a review of their 
sentence (at all) and that the British Supreme Court should be the final arbiter 
of British law, not the Strasbourg court (Kern, 2014).
The Vinter judgement only added weight to domestic calls to review and 
renew, at least, the relationship between the uk and Europe on the issue 
of human rights. Such threats were an accumulation of challenges to the 
remit of the Strasbourg court, “…the Strasbourg court should first rethink 
its pur pose  when a country such as Britain reconsiders its membership” 
(Justice Secretary Chris Grayling, cited in Mason, 2013). Anti­Strasbourg 
sentiment was prevalent in sound­bites from Westminster. The European 
courts had ‘nothing to offer the uk’ (Justice Secretary Chris Grayling, cited 
in Bowcott, 2013). Pivotally, the Vinter decision strengthened calls to with­
draw  from the convention and court altogether (Kirkup, 2013; Mason, 2013). 
Such an unprecedented withdrawal though would be ‘disastrous’ with far 
reaching consequences for both the convention and the court (Grieve, 2014; 
Gibb, 2014) (a revision of the relationship with the court would be a legal and 
practical impossibility leaving only the option (and strengthened threat) of 
withdrawal).
By 2014, preceding the recent retreat from Vinter in Hutchinson v United 
Kingdom, other nations were citing the position of the United Kingdom as a 
defence of their abrogation of responsibility under various human rights laws 
and treaties,
…our departure (from the Convention) as one of its principal creators 
and supporters will be so damaging to it. It is already the case that coun­
tries such as Russia are using the uk position to try to procrastinate on 
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implementing judgments. Indeed the effect of our conduct will go fur­
ther as the uk’s ambivalence is being cited by countries such as Venezuela 
in ignoring obligations under the American Convention on Human 
Rights arising prior to its denunciation of it in 2012 and citing Britain’s 
approach as a justification and by the president of Kenya over the juris­
diction of the icc. It bodes ill for all whose lives have been or could be 
beneficially affected by the existence of the Convention and the work of 
the Strasbourg Court and by Human rights conventions generally.
Grieve, 2014
The year after Vinter, the Conservative Party published a paper, ‘Protecting 
Human Rights in the uk’, which (whilst remaining within the eu) advocated 
breaking the link between British courts and the Strasbourg court so that the 
uk would take no further account of the rulings of the ECtHR (Grieve, 2014). 
Particularly, the paper accuses the ECtHR of ‘mission creep’, expanding beyond 
its original scope and the intention of the framers of the Convention, “…there 
is mounting concern at Strasbourg’s attempts to overrule decisions of our dem­
ocratically elected Parliament and overturn the uk courts’ careful applications 
of Convention rights”, cited in a list of examples of the court’s mission creep 
was the Vinter decision (Conservatives, 2014:3). According to the proposals, 
‘fundamental changes would restore common sense and put Britain first’, spe­
cifically, reforms would make the ECtHR no longer binding over the uk 
Supreme Court and the ECtHR would become an advisory body only, unable to 
order a change in uk law (Conservatives, 2014:5).
The Council of Europe responded “We take note of these proposals by the 
Conservative Party. We also take note they are not draft legislation. As they 
stand, the proposals are not consistent with the echr” (Morrison, 2014). The 
threat from the Conservative Party remained, “In the event that we are unable 
to reach that agreement (with the Council of Europe) (for renegotiation of 
terms), the uk would be left with no alternative but to withdraw from the 
European Convention on Human Rights…” (Morrison, 2014).
Threats to withdraw the uk from the European Convention on Human 
Rights thus only strengthened and increased after the Vinter decision, aggra­
vated by decisions regarding prisoner voting (Creighton, 2013) and a litany of 
unfavourable and unpopular decisions regarding offenders’ extradition.
If we cannot reach agreement that our courts and our parliament will 
have the final say over these matters then we will have to withdraw. 
We have the right to withdraw, it is specifically provided for in the con­
vention. We would exercise that right. There is always a first time for 
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everything… We cannot go on with a situation where crucial decisions 
about how this country is run and how we protect our citizens are taken 
by the echr and not by our parliament and our own courts. We also have 
to be much clearer about when human rights laws should be used, and 
those rights have to be balanced with responsibilities. People in this 
country are fed up with human rights being used as an excuse for unac­
ceptable behaviour. We will always stand against real human rights 
abuses and political persecution. But these plans will make sure that 
we put Britain first and restore common sense to human rights in this 
country.
Justice Secretary chris grayling, cited in watt and bowcott, 2014
The Conservative position was quickly being characterised as the future plan 
for the country, in light of the impossibility, practically and legally, of forging a 
separate relationship with the Convention and court,
We can no longer tolerate this mission creep…What we have effectively is 
a legal blank cheque, where the court can go where it chooses to go. We 
will put in place a provision that will say that the rulings of Strasbourg 
will not have legal effect in the uk without the consent of parliament. 
Effectively, what we are doing is turning Strasbourg into an advisory body.
Justice Secretary chris grayling, cited in bowcott, 2014
Such a position, of course, signified and demonstrated an opposition to 
Strasbourg,
On the face of it (after the Vinter decision) the Conservative Party is now 
committed to the uk’s withdrawal from the Convention – since amend­
ing the Convention to accord the uk a veto over the European Court’s 
judgments impossible.
Morrison, 2014
5 Hutchinson, a Response to Westminster Politics
The most recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights, the Fourth 
Section, in Hutchinson v United Kingdom, has somewhat ameliorated the tension 
between Westminster and Strasbourg (Benge, 2015) and tempered the politicised 
response to Vinter. Whilst an outright confrontation had previously been kept 
at bay with favourable, yet somewhat concessionary legal interpretations of 
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European cases by domestic courts and politicians, the long held advocacy of 
whole of life had not required a public defence until the Vinter decision. The 
Vinter decision, however, forced the issue into a public arena: the uk could not 
appease domestic voters with promises of whole of life outright, and also satisfy 
its commitment to the Strasbourg court. Indeed, the opposition to the court and 
a conservative policy of law and order, and domestic sovereignty, speaks well to 
conservative voters, who might otherwise defect to more right wing political parties,
…the new Conservative “policy” is a useful anti­European dog whistle to 
help keep voters in the Conservative fold and out of the clutches of ukip 
at next May’s General Election. Lest there be any doubt that the new “pol­
icy” is first and foremost an anti­European dog whistle, listen to the fol­
lowing from David Cameron’s speech…
Of course, it’s not just the European Union that needs sorting out – it’s the 
European Court of Human Rights. When that charter was written, in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, it set out the basic rights we should 
respect. But since then, interpretations of that charter have led to a whole 
lot of things that are frankly wrong. Rulings to stop us deporting suspected 
terrorists. The suggestion that you’ve got to apply the human rights con­
vention even on the battle­fields of Helmand. And now – they want to 
give prisoners the vote. I’m sorry, I just don’t agree. Our Parliament – the 
British Parliament – decided they shouldn’t have that right.
Prime Minister david cameron, cited in morrison, 2014
In Hutchinson3 the claim was that the imposition of a whole of life sentence 
on Mr Hutchinson was contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention: ‘no 
one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or pun­
ishment’. In a retreat from the position set out by the Grand Chamber in Vinter, 
the fourth section dismissed Hutchinson’s claim. Yet, the decision of the Fourth 
Section in Hutchinson was only a response to the uk’s hardened political posi­
tion, not to any legal change that occurred after Vinter: the claim in Hutchinson 
3 Arthur Hutchinson was convicted of three counts of murder and one of rape in 1984 and 
sentenced to life imprisonment. At the time, the trial judge recommended a tariff of 18 years. 
Four years later the judge recommended a whole of life tariff “for the requirements of retri­
bution and deterrence”. The Lord Chief Justice concurred, “I do not think that this man 
should ever be released, quite apart from the risk which would be involved”. In December 
1994, it was communicated to Hutchinson that his tariff had been increased to one of whole 
of life imprisonment, a tariff since upheld by the Court of Appeal.
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was that his case was a replica of the Vinter case that preceded it, and so a find­
ing of a convention violation was likely,
The applicant submitted that his case was indistinguishable from Vinter 
and Others… The clarification offered by the Court of Appeal judgements 
in R v Newell; R v McLoughlin was in substance identical to that set 
out earlier in R v Bieber and R v Oakes, which were considered before 
the Grand Chamber in Vinter and Others before it came to a finding of 
violation … The views expressed by the Secretary of State for Justice on the 
subject of whole life orders demonstrated that there was no realistic pros­
pect of a fair, balanced and certain system under political control, and judi­
cial review was no remedy for this, since it provided a review of process and 
not of substance… in the applicant’s submission a mechanism “pieced 
together” from an executive discretion, a statutory provision limited to 
compassionate grounds and supervised at a distance by judicial review was 
too uncertain, lacked clarity and offered too vague a hope of release to pass 
the standard set out in Vinter and Others. Prior to the delivery of the Court 
of Appeal’s judgment in R v Newell; R v McLoughlin, the government rec­
ognised that the principles set out by the Grand Chamber in Vinter and 
Others ‘would appear on face value to apply to this case’….
Hutchinson v United Kingdom, 2015 at 16
The key element then is the reasoning of the court in R v Newell; R v McLoughlin 
yet, this is unchanged in substance from previous judgements, and unchanged 
since the decision in Vinter.
…the Court of Appeal delivered a judgement in which it expressly 
expressed responded to the concerns in Vinter and Others…In R v Newell; 
R v McLoughlin the Court of Appeal held that it was of no consequence 
that the Lifer Manual had not been revised, since it was clearly estab­
lished in domestic law that the Secretary of State was bound to exercise 
his power under section 30 in a manner compatible with Article 3.
Hutchinson v United Kingdom, 2015:23
The Court of Appeal in R v Newell; R v McLoughlin did no more than to say the 
power of the Secretary of State was commensurate with Article 3 of the 
European Convention; there has been no substantive change yet, the Strasbourg 
Court supported the response, without any change in procedure, law, or the 
role of the executive. This lack of change is the key point of the dissenting 
opinion of Judge Kalaydjieva in Hutchinson;
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…the majority in the present case failed to express any view as to whether, 
how and at what point the interpretation of the domestic law established 
in Bieber (2009) and R v Newell; R v McLoughlin (2014) changed, ceased 
to apply or made the applicant’s situation more compatible with the 
principles laid down by the Grand Chamber in examining the situation 
of the applicants in Vinter.
Dissent of Judge kalaydjieva, Hutchinson v United Kingdom, 2015
6 Conclusion
What had changed then is the perception in Strasbourg, at least of the fourth 
section. It is contended that whilst the legal position had not altered, the atti­
tude of the uk government had hardened further, the opposition to Strasbourg 
strengthened, and more ammunition given to a campaign to withdraw from 
the European Convention and the Court. The Vinter decision came at the tail 
end of what Westminster perceived to be a string of unfavourable decisions it 
was, in essence, poised to be the straw that broke the camel’s back. After Vinter 
political rhetoric of withdrawal became formalised in a Conservative party 
paper, and an empty threat took on a very real form. The decision in Hutchinson 
not only backs down from Vinter, it goes someway to diffusing the tension with 
Westminster. Hutchinson was a decision of the Fourth Section, it is now up to 
the Grand Chamber to take referral of the case or, retreat from the Vinter deci­
sion and allow the issue to rest. Whether or not the Conservative Party is in 
power at that point may be a pivotal factor in that decision but, if the Grand 
Chamber remains unpersuaded by either the Hutchinson decision, or political 
threat, the issue of whole of life tariffs will take another turn and, quite possi­
bly, the political threat of withdrawal will be put to the test.
Should the case not proceed from the Fourth Chamber, any respite for the issue 
is only likely to be temporary. With an average of more than 3 whole of life tariffs 
handed out per year in the 10 years after the passage of the 2003 Criminal Justice 
Act (and with the scope of imposition widened to now include the murder of 
police officers and prison guards (under the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015)), 
the whole of life tariff is perhaps becoming less rare than was ever intended; a con­
sequence likely to have been neither foreseen in Westminster or Strasbourg.
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